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Abstract
Background: Medical researchers often need to share clinical data without violating patient
confidentiality. Threshold cryptographic protocols divide messages into multiple pieces, no single
piece containing information that can reconstruct the original message. The author describes and
implements a novel threshold protocol that can be used to search, annotate or transform
confidential data without breaching patient confidentiality.
Methods: The basic threshold protocol is: 1) Text is divided into short phrases; 2) Each phrase is
converted by a one-way hash algorithm into a seemingly-random set of characters; 3) Threshold
Piece 1 is composed of the list of all phrases, with each phrase followed by its one-way hash; 4)
Threshold Piece 2 is composed of the text with all phrases replaced by their one-way hash values,
and with high-frequency words preserved. Neither Piece 1 nor Piece 2 contains information linking
patients to their records. The original text can be re-constructed from Piece 1 and Piece 2.
Results: The threshold algorithm produces two files (threshold pieces). In typical usage, Piece 2 is
held by the data owner, and Piece 1 is freely distributed. Piece 1 can be annotated and returned to
the owner of the original data to enhance the complete data set. Collections of Piece 1 files can be
merged and distributed without identifying patient records. Variations of the threshold protocol
are described. The author's Perl implementation is freely available.
Conclusions: Threshold files are safe in the sense that they are de-identified and can be used for
research purposes. The threshold protocol is particularly useful when the receiver of the threshold
file needs to obtain certain concepts or data-types found in the original data, but does not need to
fully understand the original data set.
Background
Many countries have implemented laws regulating the
uses of confidential medical records. In the United States,
restrictions on the research uses and electronic transfer of
confidential medical records are covered by two Federal
Regulations: The Common Rule (Title 45 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 46, Protection of Human Subjects) [1]
and the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information, Final Rule (usually referred to under
the broader act, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act, HIPAA)[2]. Researchers who wish to use
confidential medical records must fully comply with these
two sets of regulations. Both regulations permit the use of
preexisting records for human subject research when the
records are rendered harmless (through de-identifica-
tion). Both regulations specify that deidentified records
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can be used for research purposes without obtaining in-
formed consent from patients. The ability to conduct re-
search without obtaining patient consent is crucial for
studies using large numbers of pre-existing patient
records.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and implement a
threshold protocol that can facilitate the exchange of med-
ical information useful for research purposes. A threshold
protocol is a cryptographic technique that splits informa-
tion into pieces, none of which contains sufficient infor-
mation to re-create the original text [3]. The protocol
permits the original information to be reconstructed from
some number of the derived pieces (the threshold
number). Threshold protocols have been used since an-
tiquity, commonly appearing as plot devices in adventure
novels. A map to buried treasure is divided among the
central characters, a puzzle is reconstructed when five
missing pieces are assembled, measured turns of the com-
bination lock are distributed to three untrustworthy co-
conspirators, matching rings in a set are destroyed, etc.
Methods
A generalized confidentiality problem can be presented as
a negotiation protocol between Alice and Bob.
Bob has a file containing the medical records of millions
of patients. Alice has secret software that can annotate
Bob's file, enhancing its value many-fold. Alice won't give
Bob her secret algorithm, but is willing to demonstrate the
algorithm if Bob gives her his database. Bob won't give Al-
ice the database, but he can give her little snippets of the
database containing insufficient information to match pa-
tients with records.
Bob prepares an algorithm that transforms his file into
two threshold pieces. Piece 1 is a file that contains all of
the phrases from the original file with each phrase at-
tached to its one-way hash value. A one-way hash value is
a character string composed of a fixed number of seeming-
ly random characters selected by a mathematical algo-
rithm that cannot be reversed [3]. The one-way hash has
two important properties: 1) a phrase will always yield the
same hash value when operated on by the one-way hash
algorithm, and 2) there is no feasible way to determine
the phrase by inspecting or manipulating the hash value.
This second property holds true even if the hashing algo-
rithm is known. Bob will give Alice Piece 1.
Piece 2 is a file wherein each phrase from the original file
is replaced by its one-way hash value. High frequency
words (so-called "stop" words such as the, and, an, but, if,
etc.) are left in place in Piece 2. The use of "stop" words to
extract useful phrases from text is a popular indexing tech-
nique [4,5]. The list of "stop" words used in the threshold
algorithm was taken directly from the National Library of
Medicine's PubMed resource [4] and was chosen because
it is a publicly available list. Alternate lists of "stop" words
have been used for specific indexing purposes [5]. Piece 2
and Piece 1 are used to reconstruct the original text or an
annotated version of the original text, using Alice's modi-
fications to Piece 1. The reconstruction algorithm simply
steps through all the character strings found in Piece 2.
When it encounters a hash-value, the algorithm looks at
the list of hash-values in Piece 1 and substitutes the phrase
associated with the hash-value back into the Piece 2 file.
All other terms in Piece 2 are ignored. This continues until
the end of Piece 2 is reached, at which time the Piece 2 file
has been restored as the original file (plus any annota-
tions that Alice may have added to the terms in Piece 1).
The following is an example of a single line of µ Bob's text
that has been converted into two threshold pieces accord-
ing to the described algorithm.
Bob's original Text:
"they suggested that the manifestations were as severe in
the mother as in the sons and that this suggested auto-
somal dominant inheritance."
Bob's Piece 1.
684327ec3b2f020aa3099edb177d3794 = > 
suggested autosomal dominant inheritance
3c188dace2e7977fd6333e4d8010e181 = > 
mother
8c81b4aaf9c2009666d532da3b19d5f8 = > 
manifestations
db277da2e82a4cb7e9b37c8b0c7f66f0 = > suggested
e183376eb9cc9a301952c05b5e4e84e3 = > sons
22cf107be97ab08b33a62db68b4a390d = >  severe
Bob's Piece 2.
they db277da2e82a4cb7e9b37c8b0c7f66f0 that the
8c81b4aaf9c2009666d532da3b19d5f8 were as
22cf107be97ab08b33a62db68b4a390d in the
3c188dace2e7977fd6333e4d8010e181 as in the
e183376eb9cc9a301952c05b5e4e84e3 and that thisBMC Medical Research Methodology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/2/12
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684327ec3b2f020aa3099edb177d3794.
The author has prepared a Perl implementation that has
been placed in the public domain. Perl is itself an open-
source platform-independent language that is available at
no cost. Perl interpreters for virtually every operating sys-
tem are available at:
http://www.cpan.org
A sample thresholding script and example medical text
files can be downloaded at:
http://65.222.228.150/jjb/thresh.tar.gz
Methods for decompressing tar.gz files are freely available
and described at:
http://www.gzip.org/#faq6
The text files used were taken from the publicly available
medical text, Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man
(OMIM) [6]. The complete OMIM exceeds 70 Mbyte and
can be downloaded in simple ASCII format. Because this
text is publicly available, it is an ideal corpus for testing fu-
ture thresholding algorithms against the algorithm sug-
gested in this article. Piece 1 and Piece 2 files constructed
from the first megabyte of OMIM are included in the dis-
tribution file (thresh.tar.gz). Instructions for download-
ing the complete OMIM text are available at:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Omim/
The Perl implementation of the threshold file is fast. A text
file exceeding 2 MegaBytes was rendered into two thresh-
old pieces in 10 seconds. A Pentium 4 CPU with 480 Meg-
aBytes of RAM was used. Variations on the
implementation can substantially slow performance. For
example, it may be desirable to exclude punctuation from
the extracted phrases added to Piece 1, while preserving
the location of punctuation in Piece 2. Likewise, saving
case information (uppercase vs. lowercase formatting)
would also lengthen execution time. A sample Perl script
that preserves case and punctuation is provided in the
public distribution file.
As an example of how threshold pieces can be used to en-
hance the value of the original data records, phrases were
autocoded using Concept Unique Identifiers (CUIs)
found in the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS)
[7]. The UMLS is a standard medical terminology availa-
ble at no cost from the National Library of Medicine at:
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/umlsmain.html
A tarballedgzipped collection of a Perl class library con-
taining methods for autocoding (i.e. automatically assign-
ing UMLS CUI numbers) and scrubbing text can be
downloaded as a supplementary file from:
http://65.222.228.150/jjb/parse.tar.gz
Results
Properties of Piece 1 and Piece 2
Piece 1 (the listing of phrases and their one-way hashes)
1. Contains no information on the frequency of occur-
rence of the phrases found in the original text (because re-
curring phrases map to the same hash code and appear as
a single entry in Piece 1).
2. Contains no information that Alice can use to connect
any patient to any particular patient record. Records do
not exist as entities in Piece 1.
3. Contains no information on the order or locations of
the phrases found in the original text.
4. Contains all the concepts found in the original text.
Stop words are a popular method of parsing text into con-
cepts [4,5].
5. Bob can destroy Piece 1 and re-create it later from the
original file, using the same threshold algorithm.
6. Alice can use the phrases in Piece 1 to transform, anno-
tate or search the concepts found in the original file.
7. Alice can transfer Piece 1 to a third party without violat-
ing HIPAA privacy rules or Common Rule human subject
regulations (in the U.S.). For that matter, Alice can keep
Piece 1 and add it to her database of Piece 1 files collected
from all of her clients.
8. Piece 1 is not necessarily unique. Different original files
may yield the same Piece 1 (if they're composed of the
same phrases). Therefore Piece 1 cannot be used to au-
thenticate the original file used to produce Piece 1.
Properties of Piece 2
1. Contains no information that can be used to connect
any patient to any particular patient record.
2. Contains nothing but hash values of phrases and stop
words, in their correct order of occurrence in the original
text.
3. Anyone obtaining Piece 1 and Piece 2 can reconstruct
the original text.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/2/12
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4. The original text can be reconstructed from Piece 2, and
any file into which Piece 1 has been merged. There is no
necessity to preserve Piece 1 in its original form.
5. Bob can lose or destroy Piece 2, and re-create it later
from the original file, using the same threshold algorithm.
Security
If Alice had Piece 1 and Piece 2 she could simply use Piece
1 to find the text phrases that match the hash-values in
Piece 2. Substituting the phrases back into Piece 2 will rec-
reate Bob's original line of text. Bob must ensure that Alice
never obtains Piece 2.
The negotiation between Alice and Bob
Bob prepares threshold Pieces 1 and 2 and sends Piece 1
to Alice. Alice may require Bob to prove the authenticity
of Piece 1, but Bob has no reason to care if Piece 1 is inter-
cepted by an unauthorized party. Alice uses her software
(which may be secret, or it may require computational fa-
cilities that Bob doesn't have, or it may require large data-
bases that Bob doesn't have), to transform or annotate
each phrase from Piece 1. The transformation product for
each phrase can be almost anything that Bob considers
valuable (e.g., a UMLS code, a genome database link, an
image file URL, or a tissue sample location). Alice substi-
tutes the transformed text (or simply appends the trans-
formed text) for each phrase back into Piece 1, co-locating
it with the original one-way hash number associated with
the phrase.
Let's pretend that Alice has an autocoder that provides a
standard nomenclature code to medical phrases that oc-
cur in text. The author has recently described an autocod-
ing algorithm, which is now in the public domain (see
Methods section).
Alice's software transforms the original phrases from Piece
1, preserving the original hash values. Phrases from Piece
1 that occur in the Unified Medical Language System now
have been given code numbers by Alice's software.
684327ec3b2f020aa3099edb177d3794 = > 
suggested (autosomal dominant inheritance=C0443147)
3c188dace2e7977fd6333e4d8010e181 = > 
(mother=C0026591)
8c81b4aaf9c2009666d532da3b19d5f8 = > 
manifestations
db277da2e82a4cb7e9b37c8b0c7f66f0 = > 
suggested
e183376eb9cc9a301952c05b5e4e84e3 = > 
(son=C0037683)
22cf107be97ab08b33a62db68b4a390d = > 
(severe=C0205082)
Alice returns the coded phrase list (above) from Piece 1 to
Bob. Bob now takes the transformed Piece 1 and substi-
tutes the transformed phrases for each occurrence of the
hash values occurring in Piece 2 (which he has saved for
this very purpose).
The reconstructed sentence is now:
they suggested that the manifestations were as (se-
vere=C0205082) in the (mother=C0026591) as in the
(son=C0037683) and that this suggested (autosomal
dominant heritance=C0443147)
The original sentence is now annotated with UMLS codes.
It was accomplished without sharing confidential infor-
mation that might have been contained in the text. Bob
never had access to Alice's software. Alice never had the
opportunity to see Bob's original text.
Implementation issues
Depending on the types of files that need to be converted
into threshold pieces, some data preparation may be nec-
essary In particular, when using actual medical records, it
may be useful to encrypt or delete specific identifier fields,
as listed in HIPAA. Institutions may wish to pre-process
files to delete specific words, terms, or character strings
from the original file. Methods for scrubbing text would
apply equally to scrubbing the phrases in Piece 1. Addi-
tionally, institutions may wish to ambiguate the Piece 1
file by adding non-informative text to their original file.
This may have some advantage when the original file is
small or contains the records of a small number of differ-
ent individuals.
The original file that is actually used by the algorithm can
itself be assigned a hash number, as should Piece 1 and
Piece 2. These three hash numbers could be saved and
used for authentication, book-keeping or tracking purpos-
es in later stages of a data negotiation protocol.
Issues of data space collisions arise when using very large
files. A data space collision occurs when two different
phrases are assigned the same hash-value by the hashing
algorithm. This problem could be handled a number of
different ways, including adding a subroutine that looks
for collisions, computing an alternate hash value when
collisions occur. The easiest way to avoid collisions is to
employ a one-way hash algorithm that has a large key. The
current implementation of the threshold algorithm usesBMC Medical Research Methodology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/2/12
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md5, which has a 128-bit key [3]. SHA (Secure Hash Algo-
rithm) is recommended for U.S. federal agencies by NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) [3].
SHA256, the 256-bit version of SHA, is widely available.
Using a 256-bit secure hash would mitigate issues of data-
space collisions for sub-terabyte data sets.
Discussion
Until recently, many researchers who collected confiden-
tial or proprietary data had a heavy-handed way of dealing
with confidentiality issues: they denied everyone access to
their data. As a result, the scientific community had no
way of verifying, replicating or extending research con-
ducted by their colleagues. The U.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH), sensing that data hoarding has become an
impediment to medical progress, has promoted data shar-
ing by NIH funded scientists. Recently, the NIH has issued
a draft statement to emphasize this policy [8].
"The NIH will expect investigators supported by NIH
funding to make their research data available to the scien-
tific community for subsequent analyses. Consequently,
the NIH will require that data sharing be addressed in
grant applications (e.g., in sections related to significance,
budget, and the end of the research plan) and in the re-
view of applications. Funds for sharing or archiving data
may be requested in the original grant application or as a
supplement to an existing grant. Investigators who incor-
porate data sharing in the initial design of the study can
more readily and economically establish adequate proce-
dures for protecting the identities of participants and pro-
vide a useful data set with appropriate documentation. "
After the draft statement was issued, research societies re-
quested NIH to develop techniques for data sharing that
protect confidential information (i.e., identified patient
records or intellectual property) [9]. In particular, concern
was expressed that methods for keeping data confidential
must conform to the emerging HIPAA privacy standards.
Although the NIH has responded with general guidelines
for protecting confidential information, no actual proto-
cols, algorithms or implementations have been made
available to the research community. The only guidelines
that the author has found that in any way resemble a uni-
form approach to de-identification is the so-called safe
harbor list of patient identifiers specified in the HIPAA
privacy standards [2]. Technical approaches to medical
data de-identification have recently been reviewed [10–
13].
It seems obvious that if large amounts of data are to be
shared among researchers, implementations are needed
that can quickly render large data sets harmless to pa-
tients. In order for these implementations to be accepted
by the research community, they must be freely available
to test, improve or replace (with better algorithms).
What is the value of the threshold negotiation protocol?
The original text has been converted into two pieces, nei-
ther of which contain information linking patients to
records. There is sufficient information in Piece 1 for Alice
to annotate the text and return it to Bob (annotated Piece
1). Bob can reconstruct his original text, including Alice's
annotations, thus adding value to his original data, with-
out breaching patient confidentiality. Bob can pay Alice
for her services. Alice can keep Piece 1 and use it for her
own purposes. Alice can make a large database consisting
of all the Piece 1 files she receives from all of her custom-
ers. Alice's aggregated Piece 1 database can be used by
owners of Piece 2 files to reconstruct their original files
(along with Alice's value-added annotations). Alice can
sell Piece 1 to a third party, if she wishes. Alice can contin-
ually update or otherwise enhance her annotations on
Piece 1 and sell the updated versions to Bob and others.
Variations on the threshold negotiation protocol
The same protocol could have been implemented in a
multi-party negotiation. Bob may have been a data suppli-
er with no interest in using the data himself. Suppose Car-
ol was interested in Alice's annotations of Bob's file. Bob
may have given Alice threshold Piece 1 and Carol thresh-
old Piece 2. Alice may have made her transformation of
the phrases in Piece 1 and sent the transformed version of
Piece 1 to Carol. Carol could use Alice's transformed ver-
sion of Piece 1 and her copy of Piece 2 to create a trans-
formed version of Bob's original text. This would only
work, of course, if the transformed version of Bob's origi-
nal file [produced by Carol], contains no confidential in-
formation. A variation may involve assigning Bob as the
trusted broker, who uses Piece 2 and the transformed ver-
sion of Piece 1 to create a file for Carol. In this variation,
Carol receives nothing until the end of the negotiation
and Bob can take measures to ensure that the file that Car-
ol receives is "safe."
The threshold negotiation need not be based on text ex-
change. The same negotiation would apply to any set of
data elements that can be transformed or annotated. The
threshold protocol has practical value in instances when
the receiver of Piece 1 can perform a useful annotation or
transformation of data without acquiring the intact data
record. The protocol teases apart the data records and sub-
stitutes one-way hash values back into the record. The
ways in which individual pieces of data can be trans-
formed or annotated are limited only by the imagination.
Sequences of DNA can be annotated with positional map-
pings or standard nomenclature or homdogy informa-
tion. A local institution's tissue code could be
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containing experimental results performed on the tissue.
Disease names can be supplemented with gene expression
array data collected on tissues from other patients with the
same disease.
Conclusions
A threshold protocol can render medical records harmless
by dividing data sets into de-identified pieces. De-identi-
fied pieces can be safely distributed and used to enhance
the value of the original data set or to share de-identified
data with other researchers. The protocol facilitates com-
pliance with Federal regulations that permit the exchange
of de-identified data for research purposes and may help
implement NIH's proposed data sharing policy. Most im-
portantly, this protocol is one example of how computa-
tional methods can be used to solve legal and ethical
problems faced by researchers who need access to medical
data sets.
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